


animation of the stars. The science is an inquiry into the nature, into the numerical structure of the astral divinity and motion. 7. *The nature of the supreme God*. God is an eternal and principal power. 8. *The nature of the soul*. the individual soul is the cause of the circular motion of the stars, the continuity and the constancy. 9. *The On the Philosophy had an influence upon Laws and Epinomis*. In chapter V (pp. 351-393), «The *Eudemus* and the moral and political dialogues», Berti goes through Plato's theory of forms and Aristotle's moral and political thought with an analytical method. 1., 2., 3. *Eudemus (On the Soul)*. The intellectual soul pre-exists. The soul is therefore not reducible to physical attributes but is immaterial and has a sublime substantiality as in Platonic philosophy. 4. In the *On the Justice* Aristotle manifests how the distinction between the forms of authority and justice involves the consideration of the complete reality, incompatible with Platonic ideas. 5. *The Politicus and the other moral and political dialogues*. Moral and political arguments are presented in Aristotle's works *Politicus*, *On the Pleasure*, *On the wealth*, *On the Kingdom*, *On the Education*, *On Alexander or on the colonies* and *On the Nobility*.

In chapter VI (pp. 395-485), *Protrepticus*, Berti states that the *Protrepticus* deals with the theory of knowledge of the first principles. This work constitutes the synthesis of the Aristotle's programme of his future activity. Aristotle in the *Protrepticus* and in the *On the Philosophy* defines the scientific knowledge. He invents science as conceptual, demonstrative and syllogistic organization of the philosophical studies. Human dignity and ethical entitlement are grounded in our claim to possess the theoretical and practical prudence. Aristotle asks the fundamental question: «How is happiness to be acquired?» His answer is that happiness is a matter of education. Philosopher concludes that the virtues are dispositions or states of character concerned with choice and determined by rational principle and practical wisdom, in order to appear and apply educative methods.



HELEN MARGARITOU - ANDRIANESSI

Klaus OEHLER, *Subjektivität und Selbstbewußtsein in der Antike*, Würzburg, Königshausen und Neumann, 1997, 106 pp.

This book treats the problem of subjectivity and self-consciousness in classical antiquity. Professor Oehler explores, in an original and thought-proving way, the origin, meaning and significance of subjectivity and self-consciousness as a central thesis in the development of Greek philosophy. The broad appeal of this book is increased by Professor Oehler's care to connect ancient debates to the developments in modern philosophy (starting with Descartes and continuing with the German idealists) and by his sophisticated and clearly presented methodology. The book consists (apart from the preface) of five chapters (pp. 11-90), notes (pp. 91-97), a bibliography (pp. 99-102), an index of names (pp. 103-4) and an index of topics (pp. 105-6). It is dedicated to the memory of author's teacher Gerhard Krüger (1902-1972), a scholar who gave the author the decisive impulse to deal thoroughly with the problem of consciousness in antiquity. The author has been working on this problem for many years and has provided us (among other works) with two valuable monographs: *Die Lehre vom Noetischen und Dianoetischen Denken bei Platon und Aristoteles. Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung der Geschichte des Bewußtseinsproblems in der Antike*, Hamburg, Felix Meiner Verlag, 1985² (1962); *Der Unbewegte Bewegter des Aristoteles*, Frankfurt a.M, Vittorio Klostermann Verlag, 1984. The present volume is a kind of synopsis and retraction of the results of his investigation.

Professor Oehler holds the view that the problem of reflection and self-consciousness, a central problem of the philosophy of modern times, was not discovered by modern



philosophy, but has its origin in ancient Greek philosophy. In the first chapter («Der Ursprung des philosophischen Selbstbewußtseins bei den Griechen») he outlines the historical-philosophical context in which the concept of self-consciousness was first raised. He defines reflection as «one's turn to himself and to the worldenclosing consciousness of ego» and remarks that reflection is always self-reflection, i.e. consciousness of consciousness (p. 13). The discovery and manifestation of subjective reality, a feature which already occurs in the prephilosophical literature of antiquity, is different from the rise of the consciousness. As the author notices, the discovery of mind has so much to do with the origin of philosophical self-consciousness as natural ability for thought has with the science of logic (p. 17). Mere consciousness and self-consciousness of a higher degree of reflection have a philosophical meaning only when they become objects of philosophy, i.e. when they become philosophical problems, which happens in an advanced level of thought. The exactitude of Plato's and Aristotle's theories on the appearances of thought and knowledge and on the kinds of being together with the breadth and depth the philosophers discuss these themes allow us to talk about a phenomenology of consciousness in Plato and Aristotle (p. 19). The Platonic and Aristotelian concept of reason comprises the complementary form of thought *nous* and *dianoia*. Plato's *episteme epistemes* and Aristotle's *noesis noeseos* is not the self-establishment of the self, but the formal consequence of a natural reflection within its limits. Hence it does not found the concept of philosophical consciousness of modern times. Nevertheless both thinkers went definitely forward in this direction. Further, the author compares the achievements Plato's and Aristotle's with those of Descartes on this issue and underlines the differences of their intellectual options.

In chapter II («Die Entdeckung der Selbstbeziehung des Denkens») the author discusses the «discovery and self-reference of thought». He observes that the problem of the relation between thought and being, already set with emphasis by Parmenides and Protagoras, and the related problem of self-reference underlying all knowledge is envisaged by Plato as a central problem (p. 37). This happens in *Charmides*, where it is asked whether there is a knowledge of knowledge and where the forms of the appearance of self-reference are discussed. Plato's conclusion is that self-movement, which constitutes the essence of the living being, is the original type of self-reference. According to Plato, only divine reason is autonomous, absolute and capable of pure self-reference, while human reflection is possible only as a critical verification of knowledge. Aristotle also held this view in the main. The highest point of philosophy in antiquity is, as Professor Oehler remarks, the discovery of the structure of reflection of the self-reference of knowledge (p. 39). He further notes (p. 42) that Aristotle treats self-reference as a special case of relation and interprets identity as a relation; only the thinking of the Unmoved Mover is total self-reflection. According to the author, the main difference of the Platonic-Aristotelian concept of self-reflection from the modern equivalent concept is that Plato and Aristotle did not derive the knowledge of self from an already presupposed concept of the ego.

In chapter III («Was denkt der Unbewegte Beweger?») Professor Oehler seeks to explain Aristotle's difficult doctrine of Unmoved Mover. He observes that Aristotle could conceive of a divine self-consciousness only on the ground of his cosmological and teleological assumptions. Hence the problems associated with that of the Unmoved Mover are difficult to be discussed from the viewpoint of modern hermeneutics. The author stresses that the Aristotelian concept of self-thinking thought as the divine intellect remains abstract and involves no philosophy of the real. Aristotle himself did not define the content of the concept *noesis noeseos*, although the Peripatetics and subsequent philosophy were looking for such a definition in his work. *Noesis noeseos* is an activity which falls not only to god's share: divine and human «noetical» thought are not absolutely different. They present, as the author notices (p. 59), a relation of analogy, namely that of *analogia attributionis*. It means that «the structure of self-reference *qua* self-reference is the same for divine and human thought» (*ibid.*).

In chapter IV («Vernunft und Verstand») Professor Oehler shows how the complementary relation of the concepts *noesis* and *dianoia* in Plato's and Aristotle's theory has influenced all later philosophy up to our days and how these concepts have been understood and interpreted in various ways. After proving the modes of reception of the distinction between *noesis* and *dianoia* by the scholastic philosophy, by Kant, Hegel, Reichenbach and Peirce, he discusses Peirce's concept of abduction. Following Jürgen von Kempster, he argues that Peirce's theory of abduction has the same meaning as Aristotle's theory of *apagoge* (p. 69) and that the traditional difference between *noesis* and *dianoia* appears again in Peirce's logic of science. The author stresses the role of *phronesis*, of the practical intelligence, of instinct, respectively, which functions in a complementary way to rationality. Besides, he notices that the reason must be conscious of its limits, if *hybris* is to be avoided. Within the limits of reason, he refers not only to the need for political rationality, but also to the theories of natural science, for each theory of natural science is a compromise of order with contingency, of coherent laws with uncertain facts (p. 75).

In the concluding chapter V («Descartes als das tragische Ende einer Geschichte») Professor Oehler argues that Descartes' originality consists in the creative radicalisation of a given thesis. Descartes has through his methodical statements essentially intensified the dualism between mind and matter, soul and body. His intervention was not a breaking with a tradition, but the consequence of a tradition. Further, the author discusses the differences between Descartes and Plato as far as being and thought are concerned, especially the priority of thought according to Descartes. He also emphasizes the role of the notion of freedom, a foundation of modern culture, for the formation of the modern theories of knowledge. Finally, he discusses Plato's and Aristotle's theories of truth, namely the significance of Plato's theory of *doxa* and of Aristotle's criterium of *consensus omnium* for the gain of truth. He also compares these theories with the programmes and perspectives of the European enlightenment.

This book is a brilliant and highly judicious analysis of one of the knottiest problems in the history of Greek philosophy. An awareness of the intensely rational interplay between theory-making and dialectical criticism penetrates Professor Oehler's account of the ancient theories of subjectivity and self-consciousness. His work does not only offer insight into the meaning and significance of subjectivity and self-consciousness in classical antiquity, but also forces a reconsideration of scholarship on the starting-point of the seventeenth-century rationalistic philosophy, which received its greatest impetus from the works of Descartes, and implies a new methodology for the interpretation and understanding of the beginnings of modern philosophy. Such a philosophically acute stance makes this book a splendid addition to the field of history of ancient and modern philosophy, a stimulus and a standard for future scholarship in this area.

Ioannis G. KALOGERAKOS

Néoplatonisme et Philosophie Médiévale (Actes du Colloque international de Corfou, 6-8.10.1995, édité par Linos G. Benakis), Turnhout (Belgique), Éditions Brepols, 1997, σελ. 364 (SIEPM, Rencontres de Philosophie Médiévale 6).

Ο τόμος τῶν Ἀνακοινώσεων στὸ Ἐπιστημονικὸ Συμπόσιο, ποὺ ὀργάνωσε ἡ «Διεθνὴς Ἑταιρεία Μεσαιωνικῆς Φιλοσοφίας» (SIEPM) στὴν Κέρκυρα τὸν Ὀκτώβριο 1995, ἀποτελεῖ μιὰ σπουδαία συμβολὴ στὸ μεγάλο κεφάλαιο τῶν ἐπιτροπῶν ποὺ δέχθηκε ἡ Μεσαιωνικὴ Φιλοσοφία ἀπὸ τὸν ἐλληνικὸ Νεοπλατωνισμό. Τὸ Συμπόσιο πραγματοποιοῦσε μὲ συμμετοχὴ 28 εἰδικῶν ἀπὸ ὅλο τὸν κόσμον καὶ μὲ μεγάλη ἐπιτυχία ἡ «Ἑλληνικὴ Ὁμάδα

