

AN EMENDATION AND NEW INTERPRETATION OF HERACLITUS' FR. 41:

«εἶναι γὰρ ἓν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὅτῃ ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων» (Diogenes Laertius IX 1, DK 22 B 41)¹.

Fragment 41 could be counted among Heraclitus' most problematic ones. Of course, as we shall see further on, many serious attempts have been made so far aiming both at restoring and interpreting the passage. Yet I still consider it worthwhile to attempt a new restoration and a fresh explanatory interpretation of this difficult passage, since, as rightly C. H. Kahn notes (*The art and thought of Heraclitus*, London-New York-Melbourne, 1979, p. 170), «no emendation is entirely satisfactory».

The fragment is dominated by the concepts τὸ σοφόν, γνώμη and κυβερνῶ. The verb κυβερνῶ occurs nowhere else in Heraclitus², while the noun γνώμη occurs once more (in plural form) in fragment 78; as for the noun τὸ σοφόν, it is encountered in three other fragments: 32, 50 and 108. In both fragments 32 and 41 the expression «ἓν τὸ σοφόν» occurs, where the uniqueness of τὸ σοφόν is emphasized. In fragment 108 τὸ σοφόν is without article τὸ and not linked to the numeral adjective ἓν, but it occurs within the expression «σοφόν ἐστὶ πάντων κεχωρισμένον» where it is clearly stated that τὸ σοφόν is not only one and unique but also separated and distinct from all other beings, that is, it belongs to a distinct (unique) ontological category. On other words, it is thoroughly distinguished from all other things. The case with fragment 50 is quite different because it contains neither an explicit nor an implicit reference to something unique and distinct (κεχωρισμένον). In the context of the impersonal expression σοφόν ἐστίν, it denotes a human quality, that of being wise and sensible, related to a specific epistemological attitude, and obviously it does not carry the ontological weight it bears in frag-

1. HERACLITUS B 4 1, DIELS-KRANZ, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, Berlin⁶ 1951 (henceforth: D K *Frg. der Vors*). The citation of the following fragments shall be made according to this edition.

2. In fragment 64 occurs the verb οἰακίζω which is a synonym of the verb κυβερνῶ.

ments 32, 41 and 108. This is a good reason why fragment 50 should not be related to fragment 32, 41 and 108³.

As far as fragment 41 is concerned, H. Gomperz identifies τὸ σοφὸν with γνώμη and takes them both as attributes (in the same accusative case) of the numeral adjective ἕν (object of the infinitive εἶναι according to Gomperz). It is τὸ σοφὸν in Gomperz' opinion, that rules the World⁴.

Beyond this identification between τὸ σοφὸν and γνώμη, which does not seem to correspond to the facts, H. Gomperz correctly points out that τὸ σοφὸν should be conceived as an impersonal power (as the neuter gender makes clear) that exists as a substance separated, transcendental and independent of the world, while the world cannot exist independently of τὸ σοφὸν since it is governed by τὸ σοφόν⁵. Consequently, τὸ σοφὸν may well be identified with Λόγος (qua cosmic necessity) and the divine.

Karl Reinhardt also claims τὸ σοφὸν as ruler of the world and he correctly identifies it with the divine νοῦς as may be clearly concluded from fragment 32 and 108⁶ as well. According to Reinhardt's view, therefore, it is τὸ σοφὸν and not γνώμη that rules the world. The transmission of the text of our fragment by Diogenes, particularly its indirect speech, misconstrues the original, as Reinhardt believes. That is why he proposes the restoration of the text—in direct speech—as follows: «ἐν τὸ σοφὸν ἐπίσταται γνώμην ἕτεῃ κυβερνῆσαι πάντα διὰ πάντων⁷». According to Reinhardt's restoration τὸ σοφὸν—subject of the clause—is also the ontological subject of the governance of the world; γνώμη is the ontological feature and the essence of τὸ σοφὸν which is expressed through its ruling over the world in a necessary manner⁸.

3. However, H. GOMPERZ, misinterpreting, as it is obvious (See the translation of fragment 50 by H. DIELS and W. KRANZ and their related annotations on it, *op. cit.*, and K. REINHARDT, *Parmenides und die Geschichte der griechischen Philosophie*, Frankfurt/M:V. Klostermann 1959, p. 206 and G.S. KIRK - J.E. RAVEN - M. SCHOFIELD, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (1983²), translated into the Greek by D. Kurtovic, Athens 1988, p. 196), fragment B 50 it attaches to fragments B 32, B 41 and B 108.

4. See H. GOMPERZ, *Heraklits Einheitslehre von Alois Patin als Ausgangspunkt zum Verständnis Heraklits*, in: *Wiener Studien* 43 (1922-1923), p. 117.

5. See H. GOMPERZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 117 and 119, note 1. Of course, the verb κυβερνῶ, due to its literal sense, usually governs a personal subject; but in its metaphorical use this is not necessary.

6. K. Reinhardt in order to support this opinion that this fragment is about the divine νοῦς, adduces of course fragment 32, but omits fragment 108, which, as we shall see, obviously refers to the divine as σοφὸν and πάντων κεχωρισμένον.

7. See K. REINHARDT, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

8. In K. Reinhardt's opinion the γνώμη has nearly the same import here as in fragment 78. That is he believes that the γνώμη is an ontological characteristic of τὸ σοφόν, and that its

Olof Gigon's interpretation of the fragment is radically different from that of his predecessors. Gigon believes that, despite the transmission of the fragment, its meaning is clear: «Es gibt nur ein Weises, den Sinn zu verstehen, der Alles bis ins Kleinste steuert⁹». According to his view, therefore, τὸ σοφὸν does not refer to the divine, but to the man, whom Heraclitus, according to Gigon's interpretation, considers wise; the man who has reached the knowledge of the way of ruling over the world: «ἡ κυβερνᾶται πάντα διὰ πάντων¹⁰».

J. Mansfeld's interpretation (*Die Vorsokratiker*, Stuttgart: Ph. Reclam J. 1987, p. 256) of this fragment is similar to that made by O. Gigon (Ursprung, p. 241).

Marcovich's interpretation of the fragment approaches that of Gigon's (*op. cit.*, concerning mainly the first part of the fragment), since according to him τὸ σοφὸν «applies here to human wisdom, and not to the divine principle from Fr. 83 and 84» and γνώμη «probably refers to the divine guiding principle». Yet his arguments are not convincing. He does not say, for example, which is the reason why τὸ σοφὸν of the fr. 84 (DK 32) identifies with «the wise being», «absolute wisdom» or «the divine principle» whereas τὸ σοφὸν of the fr. 85 (DK 41) identifies with the «human wisdom», though, apart from the rest arguments presented in this article, in both cases τὸ σοφὸν is found in the phrase «ἐν τὸ σοφόν», and furthermore the reference of both fragments is cosmological and somewhat metaphysical. And surely the assertion: «The sentence “εἶναι γὰρ ἐν τὸ σοφόν” is clear in itself» (M. Marcovich, Heraclitus, Merida-Venezuela 1967, p. 450) is not convincing. Neither C. H. Kahn's interpretation is satisfactory, since he also interprets τὸ σοφὸν from the point of view of Anthropology, and without sufficient argumentation he ascribes to γνώμη the ruling of the world.

content lies in the ruling over the world. On this issue, O. GIGON disagrees with Reinhardt's thesis (See *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit*, Leipzig: Dieterische Verlagsbuchhandlung 1935, p. 143).

9. O. GIGON, *Der Ursprung der griechischen Philosophie*, Basel-Stuttgart: Schwabe Verlag 1968, p. 241. This interpretation of fragment 41 is somewhat different from the one which he expressed in his doctoral dissertation (*Untersuchungen zu Heraklit*, p. 144): «Eines heisst weise sein, erkennen wie alles bis ins einzelne regiert wird».

10. That is, O. Gigon suggests the substitution of ὀτέη by ὀκη or ὀπη: «In ὀτέη» —he thinks— muss ein “Wie” stecken. Mir scheint es nicht zu kün, mit Bywater rücksichtslos zu korrigieren und ὀτέη als einen beliebigen sekundären Fehler abzulehnen. Oder sollte vielleicht ὀπη bzw. ὀκη möglich sein (Cf. EMPEDOKLES 21 B 110, 5, 112, 9)? (*Untersuchungen zu Heraklit*, p. 144). A complete picture of all MS-readings as well as of the emendations is given by MARCOVICH, *op. cit.*, pp. 447- 450. Cf. C. H. KAHN, *op. cit.*, notes 204 and 205.



That is, according to his opinion τὸ σοφὸν should be conceived in contrast to the much learning and at the same moment as «the human insight into this cosmic plan» (See C. H. Kahn, *op. cit.*, p. 171).

In my opinion, fragment 41 should be restored as follows: («Δεῖ γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην εἶναι) ἔν τὸ σοφόν, ὅτ'¹¹ ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων¹²». In other words, the expression «ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην» is not an

11. As regards the problematic form ὅτέη mainly the following attempts to the restoration of the passage have gone, beyond Gigon's, which we have already cited. But first it must be pointed out that, among others, H. Diels, W. Kranz and H. Gomperz accept the form ὅτέη.

K. REINHARDT (*op. cit.*, p. 200) replaces ὅτέη with ἔτεη. His emendation though, however ingenious is, does not solve the problem, because in the place of ὅτέη we need some form of relative pronoun ὅστις which will be in agreement with the gender of the noun τὸ σοφόν, since the noun γνώμη is not an organic part of the fragment. The fragment, according to Reinhardt's emendation, takes the following form: «ἔν τὸ σοφόν ἐπίσταται γνώμη ἔτεη· κυβερνήσαι πάντα διὰ πάντων». But K. R. interpretation, which takes the infinitive clause as explicative of γνώμη cannot be regarded as convincing (See O. GIGON, *Untersuchungen zu Heraklit*, p. 143).

G. S. Kirk-J. E. Raven-M. Schofield—following O. Gigon—replace the ὅτέη with the adverb ὅκη (and ὅκη), which is an Ionian type of ὅπη (and ὅπη).

E. N. ROUSSOS retains the form ὅτέη also and attaches it, as usually, to γνώμην, and accepts with Gigon that τὸ σοφόν refers to man (See *Ἡράκλειτος (Περὶ φύσεως)*, Ἀθήνα: Δ. Ν. Παπαδήμας 1987, pp. 18 and 137); and therefore translates γνώμη by the word ἰδέα, so full of Platonic reminiscences. Of course, in order to justify the weight, he has put on γνώμη, he identifies it unsuccessfully with τὸ σοφόν. Unsuccessfully since all the parallel (in his view) which he adduces, are in no way sufficient to support his thesis. On the contrary, ANAXAGORA'S fragments B 12 and B 10 for example, support not Roussos' but my own thesis (Compare below note 13).

As to the reading ὅτέη, K. REINHARDT (*op. cit.*, p. 200) and O. GIGON (*Unters. zu Her.*, p. 143 and 144) are right considering it as impossible, as it is pointed out by Fr. BECHTEL: *Die griechischen Dialekte III*, Berlin 1924 p. 171).

In any case, in my view the reading ὅτέη, in the specific case of fragment 41, derived from an arbitrary emendation, on the part of the transcribers of the Heraclitus' own manuscript, of the original type ὅτε (singular nominative of the neuter gender of the relative pronoun: ὅστε, ἦτε, ὅτε) which they considered impossible with the immediately preceding feminine noun γνώμη, exactly because they did not understand that ὅτε refers to σοφόν, not to γνώμη, which is not an organic part of the fragment, but is part of the exhortation: «[δεῖ γὰρ ὑμᾶς] ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην». Thus, they «emended» the ὅτε to ὅτέη through the addition of an η.

Finally, it must be noted that the ὅτε in place of ὅτέη is suggested for the first time, as far as I know, by Alois Patin (See H. COMPERZ, *op. cit.*, p. 122) who, although arbitrarily, retains from fragment B 41 only the (last) relative clause: «ὅτε... διὰ πάντων» and merges—arbitrarily also—this part of fragment B 41 with fragment 50, to which he attaches the former clause from B 41. Perhaps, it is worth noting that I had already completed this article, when Patin's thesis, which, strangely enough, has been almost ignored in the subsequent literature, came to my notice.

12. Translation: You must know that one is τὸ σοφόν which rules over all without exception.

The phrase «πάντα διὰ πάντων» must be understood, as I think, within the context of the



organic part of the fragment, but simply constitutes an exhortation on the part of Heraclitus, in which case τὸ σοφὸν is (automatically) subject to the infinitive εἶναι as well as to the proverbial aorist ἐκυβέρνησε. My proposed emendation of fragment 41 leaves no ground for γνώμη as ruler of the world, since it is no longer an integral part of the fragment. Besides, the word γνώμη which occurs once more in Heraclitus (fragment 78), does not have the clear ontological overtones¹³ of τὸ σοφόν, which is identical —as is clear from fragments 32 and 108— with θεῖον (ἦθος)¹⁴, a concept that could be equivalent to θεῖος νόμος¹⁵, ξυνόν¹⁶, λόγος¹⁷, πῦρ¹⁸. In fact, τὸ σοφὸν is a more

idiosyncratic rhetorical Heraklitean diction and must be considered as an emphatic form of the simple πάντα. This is also how O. GIGON understands the same phrase (See *Unters. zu Her.* p. 145). On the contrary, I think that H. COMPERZ'S point of view is wrong (*op. cit.*, p. 117) since he renders «διὰ πάντων» as «all over», «every where». So the thesis of Diels-Kranz and Kirk-Raven-Schofield who render the phrase as “in every way”. I also believe that the rendering of the same phrase as «διὰ πάντων» is also mistaken. Furthermore, this rendering is completely evasive; I refer to K. REINHARDT'S opinion (*op. cit.*, p. 201). His opinion share J. Burnet, W. K. C. Guthrie and Marcovich (See MARCOVICH, *op. cit.*, p. 453).

13. Since in fragment B 78 ἡ γνώμη, and particularly in the plural: γνώμαι, is clearly distinguished from the divine, of which it is merely a characteristic, since that (the divine), by contrast with man, possesses accurate Knowledge of things: γνώμας.

Besides, in support of this view, i.e. the γνώμη cannot be identified with the divine which rules over the world, see Anaxagoras' fragment B 12: «καὶ γνώμην γε περὶ παντός πᾶσαν ἴσχει (sc. ὁ νοῦς) καὶ ἰσχύει μέγιστον». Here too, ὁ νοῦς, which may very well be paralleled to θεῖον ἦθος in Heraclitus' fragment B 78 and τὸ σοφόν in B 41 is the ontological vehicle of γνώμη, that is Knowledge, all embracing Knowledge: περὶ παντός, and γνώμη is nothing but a characteristic of νοῦς.

14. HERACLITUS B 78. The divine in Heraclitus is also called θεός (see B 67, B 83, B 102) and δαίμων (see B 79).

15. HERACLITUS B 114. Although the fragment speaks of the divine law, it is still concerned also with the divine itself, since the law is omnipotent: «κρατεῖ (sc. ὁ θεῖος νόμος) γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίγνεται» (Cf. H. GOMPERZ, *op. cit.*, p. 134).

16. HERACLITUS B 2, B 113 and B 114. At first we find the epithet ξυνός (=common, cf. B 2 and B 113) and then the substantic form τὸ ξυνόν (Cf. B 2 and B 114). This epithet is attributed, as a rule, to the Heraclitean λόγος and it is finally identified with it (Cf. B 2).

17. HERACLITUS B 1, B 2, B 50 and B 72. The Heraclitean λόγος is a concept which has more than one sense, because it expresses a) the universal law according to which the world is ruled: «γινομένων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε» (B 1), that is, it expresses the universal order and necessity; b) the laws or collectively the law of logic in its universal and transcendental conception: «τοῦ λόγου δ' ἐόντος ξυνοῦ ζῶουσιν οἱ πολλοὶ ὡς ἰδίαν ἔχοντες φρόνησιν» (B 2); and c) the ruler of the world: «ᾧ μάλιστα διηνεκῶς ὀμιλοῦσι λόγῳ τῷ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι» (B 72). On this last sense it is some kind of counterpart of τὸ σοφόν (B 41) and the Κεραυνός (B 64), which is taken here in place of fire.

As far as the first and the second sense of λόγος are concerned, it is worth noting that they may be understood, the first as its objective (Cf. B 67, where God is an expression for harmony



significant concept in Heraclitean philosophy, explicitly identified with the divine, at least according to the clear evidence provided by fragment 32, asserting that «ἐν τὸ σοφὸν μούνον... Ζηνὸς ὄνομα». The comparison between τὸ σοφὸν and Zeus leaves no doubt as to its identity with the divine. It should be pointed out, however, that the comparison between τὸ σοφὸν and Zeus does not at all mean the substantial identification of the Heraclitean God with the God of mythology and tradition, i.e. Zeus of the Homeric Epics. This is exactly what Heraclitus means when asserts that τὸ σοφὸν «λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα».

On the other hand, the fact that he draws the parallel between his own God —not a personal God but an impersonal divine power— and Zeus, signifies on the one hand that the parallel is valid only inasmuch as τὸ σοφόν, in the same way as for Homeric Zeus, rules over the world. This is the meaning of the expression: «λέγεσθαι ἐθέλει Ζηνὸς ὄνομα¹⁹». On the other hand, it means, or rather hints to some extent a respect for the religious tradition. Seen from this point of view, fragment 32 constitutes, in a way, a sort of bridge between the God of philosophers in general, and that of Heraclitus in particular, and the God of religious tradition.

Fragment 108 refers to the same σοφόν as well: «ὀκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα, οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τοῦτο, ὥστε γινώσκειν ὅτι σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον». Here the specification of τὸ σοφόν as a being separated from all others leads necessary to its identification with the divine. The emphatic distinction between τὸ σοφόν and κόσμος: «σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον» is especially impressive here. It is undoubtedly the same σοφόν referred to

and the union of opposites), and the second as its subjective dimension. That is why the controversies between the exponents of the first, on the one hand and the second concept on the other are rather meaningless (see K. REINHARDT, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-219). It must be noted that the Heraclitean λόγος is frequently conceived as his own doctrine (Cf. H. GOMPERZ, *op. cit.*, p. 123).

18. HERACLITUS B 64: «τὰ δὲ πάντα οἰακίζει Κεραυνός». It is evident that Κεραυνός is identified here, as Hippolytus himself, who preserves the fragment, points out, with the fire, which is the central motion of the Heraclitean cosmology. The Thunder is known as the symbol of Zeus' power and authority. This is why the ruling over the world by this Thunder acquires a personal character. On the contrary, according to fragment B 41 the ruling over the world by the impersonal σοφόν, as denoted by its neuter gender (see on this H. GOMPERZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 117 and 121), has an impersonal character. The connecting link between fragments B 41 and B 64 is fragment B 32, since it refers to the «ἐν τὸ σοφόν», in the same way as fragment B 41 and to Zeus in the same way as (indirectly) fragment B 64.

19. This most interesting and accurate interpretation of fragment B 32 is that offered by O. GIGON (*Unters. zu Her.*, pp. 139-140. See H. GOMPERZ, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-120 and K. REINHARDT, *op. cit.*, pp. 205-206).



in fragments 32 and 41, since in 32 as well τὸ σοφὸν is unique (ἕν) and is compared to Zeus, who is also unique, superior to everything else and therefore separate and distinct. In fragment 41 also τὸ σοφὸν is unique and is actually compared to Zeus (Κεραυνὸς-πῦρ) since just like Zeus (cf. fr. 64) it rules over the world²⁰. It is quite certain that the distinctive separation of τὸ σοφὸν from κόσμος in fr. 108, together with that in fr. 32, where τὸ σοφὸν is compared to Zeus, and with fr. 41, where τὸ σοφὸν rules κόσμος just like Κεραυνός (cf. fr. 64), have created the impression that τὸ σοφὸν is clearly a transcendental divinity, to be conceived in absolute «otherness» from all other concrete or abstract beings²¹. In fact there can be no doubt that Heraclitus seems to accept the idea of a transcendent God in these fragments. Yet what is really happening here is that Heraclitus is compromising with popular religious traditions²². Heraclitus' God seems to be nothing else but the union of opposites (cf. fr. 67), ὁ λόγος (cf. frs. 1 and 72) and τὸ ξυνὸν (cf. fr. 114) of the world, ὁ θεῖος νόμος (cf. frs. 30, 31, 66 and 90) and ὁ Κεραυνός (cf. fr. 64) that mean no more than world order and law, measure and proportion, the origin, unity and harmony of the world. After all, how could Heraclitus' God be possibly a substance separate from the world and transcendent — whether personal or not— in a context where the world, despite its impressive variety of forms, is essentially one and undivided, since «ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἕξ ἑνὸς πάντα» (fr. 10; cf. fr. 50) and this one is nothing else but τὸ πῦρ: «πυρός τε ἀνταμοιβή τὰ πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων» (fr. 90)? This cosmic πῦρ (fire) does not differ much from the original substance (ἀρχή) of the world according to the Milesians so that there is no place for the distinct existence of a

20. The «ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην» in fragment 41 is equal to «γινώσκειν» in fragment B 108. The first one signifies the knowledge, not possessed by people (the many) relatively to τὸ σοφὸν-ruler of the world, and the second one signifies the (true) knowledge about τὸ σοφὸν which is possessed by Heraclitus exclusively. This correlation clearly corroborates the emendation and the interpretation of B 41 proposed in the present inquiry.

21. See O. GIGON, *Unters. zu Her.*, p. 138 and K. REINHARDT, *op. cit.*, p. 205. On the contrary, τὸ σοφὸν is a mundane essence-power similar to θερμὸν and ψυχρὸν and therefore it is neither transcendent nor absolute, as in H. COMPERZ'S point of view (*op. cit.*, p. 117). The view has been put forward that τὸ σοφὸν which is «πάντων κεχωρισμένον» «need not be considered transcendently but simply in terms of the relation between the universal and the individuals: the universal is not one of «πάντα» because, in that case the part would be equated to the whole» (E. N. Roussos, *Ἡράκλειτος (Περὶ φύσεως)*, Ἀθήνα, Δ. Ν. Παπαδήμας 1987, p. 135 and 72). However interesting this thesis may be, it is contradicted by fragments B 32 and B 41, where τὸ σοφὸν is referred to as that transcendent being, which is on the one hand (B 32) related to Zeus and on the other hand (B 41) rules the world.

22. See O. GIGON, *Unters. zu Her.*, p. 140.



transcendent being, different and independent from the world as in the traditional concept of God.

Finally, the double relation between man and God is of special significance from the point of view of philosophical anthropology. On the one hand, we have a unity between God and man, inasmuch as God is an element of the world itself. On the other hand, we have a relation of clear distinction, inasmuch as God is a being «πάντων κεχωρισμένον» — or at least, we seem to have a relation of plain distinction and contrast between God and man.

Dimitrios J. PAPADIS
(Cyprus)

ΔΙΟΡΘΩΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΝΕΑ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΑΠΟΣΠΑΣΜΑΤΟΣ Β 41
ΤΟΥ ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΤΟΥ:

«Εἶναι γὰρ ἐν τῷ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὅτῃ ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων» (Διογένης Λαέρτιος IX 1, DK 22 B 41).

Περίληψη

Τὸ ἀπόσπασμα Β 41 τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου ἀνήκει στὰ πλέον προβληματικά. Ἔχουν γίνει βέβαια πολλές καὶ σοβαρὲς προσπάθειες ἀποκατάστασης τοῦ κειμένου καὶ ἐρμηνευτικῆς προσέγγισής του, ἐν τούτοις καμιά ἀπὸ αὐτὲς δὲν εἶναι ἐντελῶς ἱκανοποιητικὴ.

Ἄλλοι δέχονται ὅτι τὸ σοφὸν πρέπει νὰ ἐννοηθεῖ ὄντολογικὰ-κοσμολογικὰ καὶ —εἴτε ταυτίζεται μὲ τὴν γνώμην (H. Gomperz) εἴτε ὄχι (K. Reinhardt)— ἄρα συμπίπτει μὲ τὸ θεῖον, ποὺ κυβερνᾷ τὸν κόσμον, ἐνῶ ἄλλοι ὑποστηρίζουν (O. Gigon, J. Mansfeld, M. Marcovich, C. H. Kahn κ.λπ.) ὅτι τὸ σοφὸν πρέπει νὰ ἐννοηθεῖ ἀνθρωπολογικὰ, τὸ ἐκλαμβάνουν δηλαδὴ ὡς ἰδιότητα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

Τὸ ἀπόσπασμα πρέπει κατὰ τὴ γνώμη μου νὰ ἀποκατασταθεῖ ὡς ἐξῆς: «(Δεῖ γὰρ ὑμᾶς ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην εἶναι) ἐν τῷ σοφόν ὅτ' ἐκυβέρνησε πάντα διὰ πάντων». Ἡ φράση δηλαδὴ «ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην» δὲν ἀνήκει ὀργανικὰ στὸ ἀπόσπασμα ἀλλὰ ἐκφράζει ἀπλῶς μία προτροπὴ τοῦ Ἡρακλεί-



ΔΙΟΡΘΩΣΗ ΚΑΙ ΝΕΑ ΕΡΜΗΝΕΙΑ ΤΟΥ ΑΠΟΣΠΑΣΜΑΤΟΣ Β 41 ΤΟΥ ΗΡΑΚΛΕΙΤΟΥ

του, ὅποτε (αὐτομάτως) τὸ σοφὸν καθίσταται ὑποκείμενο τοῦ ἀπαρεμφάτου εἶναι καί, συγχρόνως, τοῦ γνωμικοῦ ἀορίστου ἐκυβέρνησε. Μὲ τὴν προτεινόμενη διόρθωση τοῦ ἀποσπ. Β 41 δὲν μπορεῖ πλέον νὰ γίνεи λόγος γιὰ τὴ γνώμη ὡς κυβερνήτη τοῦ κόσμου, ἀφοῦ δὲν ἀποτελεῖ συστατικὸ στοιχεῖο τοῦ ἀποσπάσματος. Γιὰ τὴν ταύτιση τοῦ σοφοῦ μὲ τὸ θεῖον σημαντικὴ εἶναι ἡ παράλληλη χρῆση τοῦ σοφοῦ στὰ ἀποσπάσματα τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου Β 32 καὶ Β 108.

Δημήτριος Ι. ΠΑΠΑΔΗΣ
(Κύπρος)

ΑΚΑΔΗΜΙΑ



ΑΘΗΝΩΝ

